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From: neuhaus@bloch.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern))
Subject: Re: PGP 2.2: general comments
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Date: Mon, 5 Apr 1993 17:07:07 GMT
neuhaus@vier.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern)) writes:
>[Lots of stuff.]
I hate to follow up to my own posting, but I should perhaps clarify
some things so I won't get flamed.
First of all, when I'm talking about ``factoring the modulus'' or a
``breakthrough in factoring'', what I really mean is a breakthrough in
the cryptanalysis of RSA. I know that factoring and breaking RSA are
not proven to be equivalent; it's just so damn convenient not to
repeat this every time.
I also have to admit that I don't really know if the ``non-group''
property of a cipher is essential only for key chaining. I have
thought about it a little while, but I can't find a way that a
cryptanalyst could exploit a group structure. That, of course, means
nothing at all.
Then I wrote,
>Please note that as long as it is much harder to factor a RSA modulus
>than it is to generate it, the increase in computer speed alone will
>keep key lengths and modulus factoring in lock-step, i.e., people will
>simply start using longer moduli and still be safe.
What I meant was that as long as the only advantage of the
cryptanalyst is a faster computer, then we will probably have RSA for
a long time to come, because even if 1024-bit moduli somehow could be
broken with fast computers (not with a new algorithm), then people
would simply use longer moduli. Both users and cryptanalysts benefit
from better technology in the same way.
Hope this keeps the flames away... Have fun.
--
Stephan
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