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Xref: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu sci.crypt:14987 alt.security.pgp:2420 Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!crabapple.srv.cs.cmu.edu!fs7.ece.cmu.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!gatech!swrinde!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wupost!gumby!yale!yale.edu!ira.uka.de!rz.uni-karlsruhe.de!stepsun.uni-kl.de!uklirb!posthorn!bloch!neuhaus From: neuhaus@bloch.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern)) Subject: Re: PGP 2.2: general comments Message-ID: Sender: news@posthorn.informatik.uni-kl.de (News system account) Nntp-Posting-Host: bloch.informatik.uni-kl.de Organization: University of Kaiserslautern, Germany References: Date: Mon, 5 Apr 1993 17:07:07 GMT neuhaus@vier.informatik.uni-kl.de (Stephan Neuhaus (HiWi Mattern)) writes: >[Lots of stuff.] I hate to follow up to my own posting, but I should perhaps clarify some things so I won't get flamed. First of all, when I'm talking about ``factoring the modulus'' or a ``breakthrough in factoring'', what I really mean is a breakthrough in the cryptanalysis of RSA. I know that factoring and breaking RSA are not proven to be equivalent; it's just so damn convenient not to repeat this every time. I also have to admit that I don't really know if the ``non-group'' property of a cipher is essential only for key chaining. I have thought about it a little while, but I can't find a way that a cryptanalyst could exploit a group structure. That, of course, means nothing at all. Then I wrote, >Please note that as long as it is much harder to factor a RSA modulus >than it is to generate it, the increase in computer speed alone will >keep key lengths and modulus factoring in lock-step, i.e., people will >simply start using longer moduli and still be safe. What I meant was that as long as the only advantage of the cryptanalyst is a faster computer, then we will probably have RSA for a long time to come, because even if 1024-bit moduli somehow could be broken with fast computers (not with a new algorithm), then people would simply use longer moduli. Both users and cryptanalysts benefit from better technology in the same way. Hope this keeps the flames away... Have fun. -- Stephan sig closed for inventory. Please leave your pickaxe outside. PGP 2.2 public key available on request. Note the expiration date.
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